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South African Legal Reform After April 1994
Judge Justice Moloto*
I. Historical Introduction
In order to understand the purpose and effect of the South
African reform laws enacted since 1994, a brief overview of the
laws that previously prevailed is necessary. As with all colonies
around the world, the arrival of the settler community in South
Africa prompted serious land ownership disputes. In some cases
these conflicts were resolved by wars in which the vanquished had
to give way to the victor. Other disputes were resolved in the
course of fragile negotiations between various indigenous and
settler communities. There was, however, no formal legislative
protection afforded to these arrangements. The earliest legislative
measures, the Location Acts of 1869, 1876, and 1884, were passed
by the Cape Assembly.' A farm labour shortage had impelled
some white farmers in the Cape to rent out their land to black
farmers. With this, the practice of sharecropping among black
farmers began, enabling black persons to enjoy considerable
economic freedom. The Location Acts were intended to dispossess
these sharecropper farmers and force them to work as labourers on
white-owned farms.
* Justice Moloto was born at Rustenburg, a small town in the north of South
Africa, in 1944 and matriculated at Tigerkloof High School in 1963. He earned a B.A.
degree in 1973 and a B Proc in 1978 at the University of South Africa. Judge Moloto
was admitted as an attorney in 1978 after serving his articles in Durban. He practiced law
in Durban from 1978 until 1987. He was-appointed Executive Director of the Black
Lawyers' Legal Education Centre in 1987 and served in that capacity until December
1992 when he was appointed as a corporate lawyer at Eskom. Judge Moloto was
appointed to the Land Claims Court in 1995. He has demonstrated a commitment to
uplifting the standards of the legal profession by training candidate attorneys at the
Association of Law Society's Practical School and Black Lawyers' Association
seminars, and assisting many candidates with securing financial support.
1 RUTSCH ET AL., THE NEW LAND LAWS OF SOUTH AFRICA 3 (Metis Publication
Law Service ed., rev. 6, vol. 1999).
2 Over the years, the term applied to indigenous persons in South Africa has
varied. It was "Native," then "Bantu," and then "Black." There was even a time when
they were referred to as "Plurals."
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Other South African regions enacted additional legislation in
the latter half of the nineteenth century. For example, the Free
State Ordinance No. 5 of 1876 prohibited the sale of land to
blacks, while the infamous Glen Grey Act, "under the guise of
benevolent provision of individual land tenure rights for blacks in
the Cape, imposed a ten acre limit on the size of all holdings with
no man permitted to own more than one holding."3
It was not until after the formation of the Union of South
Africa in 1910 (when the four provinces that had been independent
republics formed a unitary state) that national legislation was
enacted to regulate land allocation to blacks. The first such
legislation was the Blacks Land Act 27 of 1913, 4 which came to be
known as the first pillar of apartheid.' Largely a device to deny
blacks the right to buy land in areas designated for whites only,'
the Act prevented blacks from living on white-owned farms unless
they provided a minimum of 90 days annual labour to the
landowner.' The Act also demarcated parts of South Africa for
occupation by blacks only and prohibited acquisition of land by
blacks outside the "scheduled" areas.' The scheduled areas
comprised approximately seven percent of the land area of the
country Similarly, non-blacks were not permitted to acquire land
or an interest in land in the scheduled areas unless a specific
exception was granted by the Governor-General (now State
President). This Act was the precursor to a long list of racially
based legislation designed to further limit black persons' access to
land and to regulate their movements within the country.
In 1923, the second pillar of apartheid was passed: the Blacks
(Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923, which established locations for
3 RUTSCH ETAL., supra note 1, at 3.
4 Blacks Land Act 27 of 1913 (repealed 1998).
5 T.W. Bennett, African Land-A History of Dispossession, in SOUTHERN CROSS





9 Id.; see also D.L. CAREY-MILLER & ANNE POPE, LAND TITLE IN SOUTH AFRICA
21 (Juta & Co. ed., 2000) (explaining that the Beaumont Commission's proposals were
drastically reduced due to pressure from interest groups, leaving Africans with only 7.3
percent of the land area in South Africa).
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blacks and single-sex hostels in urban areas."0 Blacks could live
only in these specified locations, and non-blacks could not acquire
land rights there." Soon thereafter, the Black Administration Act
38 of 1927 created the third and most formidable pillar of
apartheid.' 2 This Act consolidated the control and administration of
blacks into one act.' 3 Its administrative provisions regulated such
matters as the solemnization of marriages between blacks, the
appointment of native commissioners, chiefs and headmen, the
hearing of cases between blacks, the demarcation of tribal
boundaries, land registration and tenure, and the administration of
black deceased estates.'4 The Act ostensibly provided for the
complete subjugation of blacks in South Africa. Section 1 of the
Act states:
The Governor-General [later State President] shall be the
supreme chief of all Natives in the Provinces of Natal,
Transvaal, and Orange Free State, and shall in any part of the
said Provinces be vested with all such powers and authorities in
respect of all Natives as are, at the commencement of this Act,
vested in him in respect of Natives in the Province of Natal.'5
Section 5 enumerates the "powers and authorities" of the
Governor-General. Specifically, the Governor-General could:
(a) define the boundaries of the area of any tribe or of a location,
and from time to time alter the same, and may divide existing
tribes into one or more parts or amalgamate tribes or parts of
tribes into one tribe, or constitute a new tribe, as necessity or the
good government of the Natives may in his opinion require;
(b) whenever he deems it expedient in the general public
interest, order the removal of any tribe or portion thereof or any
Native from any place to any other place within the Union upon
such conditions as he may determine; provided that in the case
of a tribe objecting to such removal, no such order shall be given
10 Blacks (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923 (repealed 1945); see also Bennett, supra
note 5, at 82 (describing how this Act, although repeatedly amended, remained the key
statutory device controlling Africans in urban areas until 1986).
11 Bennett, supra note 5, at 82.
12 Id. Black Administration Act 38 of 1927, 6 BSRSA pt. 28 (2000). The Act later
became known as the Bantu Administration Act.
13 CAREY-MILLER & POPE, supra note 9, at 25.
14 Black Administration Act 38 of 1927.
15 Id. § 1.
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unless a resolution approving of the removal has been adopted
by both Houses of Parliament.
6
On the basis of these and similar powers in other statutes, the
government forcibly removed many communities from their areas
without compensation. 7
The Black Administration Act also contained provisions for
the control of movements by blacks outside the scheduled areas'8
and for the control of their speech and behavior.'9 South African
legal scholars have criticized this Act extensively:
This Act was used constantly to promulgate a vast variety of
regulations impinging on every aspect of the life of blacks.
Featuring strongly amongst these proclamations and regulations
was the administrative control of land, land tenure, land use and
every conceivable activity that took place on land in black rural
and urban areas as demarcated by the two Land Acts of 1913
and 1936.
One of the worst aspects of the Black (Native) Administration
Act and the Proclamations/Regulations promulgated in terms of
the Act was that the legislation created and thereafter sustained
"another world" wherein black persons have been forced to live,
work and raise their families under rules and conditions which
do not apply to other races in South Africa. The legislation was
coercive, oppressive and regulatory to a degree that in almost
16 Id. § 5(1).
17 See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
18 Id. § 28(1) (repealed 1952). The Act provided that:
The Governor-General may, by proclamation in the Gazette:
(a) create and define pass areas within which Natives may be required to
carry passes;
(b) prescribe regulations for the control and prohibition of the movement of
Natives into, within or from any such areas; and
(c) repeal all or any of the laws relating to the carrying of passes by natives.
Id.
'9 Id. § 29(1) (repealed 1993).
Any person who utters any words or does any other act or thing whatever
with intent to promote any feelings of hostility between Natives and
Europeans shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to
imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or to a fine of one
hundred pounds or both.
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every hour of a black person's life (whether awake or asleep) he
or she might well have been committing an "offence." In respect
of rights to occupy land for any purpose its provisions were
multifarious. 0
The Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 followed the
Black Administration Act.' The purpose of this Act was to
"provide for the establishment of a South African Native Trust and
to define its purposes; to make further provision as to the
acquisition and occupation of land by natives and other persons; to
amend Act 27 of 1913; and to provide for other incidental
matters. 22 More specifically, this Act increased the scheduled land
area set aside for black occupation in the 1913 Blacks Land Act.
These additions were called "released" areas and, together with the
scheduled areas of the 1913 Act, constituted approximately
thirteen percent of South Africa's land area. The Governor-
General, the so-called supreme chief of the blacks, was the
designated trustee-the practical result being that areas allocated
or demarcated for black occupation were owned by a white head
of state who had far-reaching powers over black tenure on such
land.23 In other words, blacks occupied this land at the sufferance
20 RUTSCH ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
21 Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 (repealed 1991).
22 Statutory Purpose for Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 (repealed
1991).
23 § 5(1) of Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. Section 5(l)(b) of the Act was
amended by § 20 of Black Laws Amendment Act 54 of 1952 to read:
The Governor-General may-
(b) whenever he deems it expedient in the general public interest, order
that, subject to such conditions as he may determine, any tribe, portion of a
tribe or native shall withdraw from any place to any other place or to any
district or province within the Union and shall not at any time thereafter or
during a period specified in the order return to the place from which the
withdrawal is to be made or proceed to any place, district or province other
than the place, district or province indicated in the order, except with the
written permission of the Secretary for Native [subsequently referred to as
Black] Affairs: Provided that if a tribe refuses or neglects to withdraw as
aforesaid no such order shall be given or, having been given, shall be of any
force and effect until a resolution approving of the withdrawal has been
adopted by both Houses of Parliament: Provided further that any such order
made in respect of a portion of a tribe or a native which is still in force after
the expiry of a period of twelve months from the date of service thereof
shall be laid upon the Tables of both Houses of Parliament within fourteen
2001]
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of the Governor-General so that non-blacks effectively owned one
hundred percent of the land. 2' This legislation also separated the
black rural areas from the white rural areas, thereby degrading
black land tenure through administrative control and forcing
blacks to become wage labourers on white farms or in the
industrial centers of the country.25
The migration of blacks from the rural areas to the cities led to
the enactment of The Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25
of 1945,26 more commonly known as the "Influx Control" Act. The
South African government wanted the cities to be preserved for
white occupation only and designed this legislation to implement
that objective. In order to qualify for residence in an urban area
under this act, blacks either had to (1) have been born in the urban
areas, (2) have lawfully and continuously lived there for fifteen
years, (3) have worked for one employer for more than ten
consecutive years, or (4) have entered the urban area pursuant to a
work permit as a migrant worker, in which case one was expected
to return "home" to the rural areas at least once a year to renew the
work permit. This Act also required blacks to carry identity
documents (passes or dompas) 27 at all times.28 The document was
endorsed according to whether you were born or had lived
days after the expiry of such period if Parliament is then in ordinary
session, or if Parliament is not then in ordinary session, within fourteen
days after the commencement of its next ensuing ordinary session, and shall
if both Houses of Parliament pass resolutions disapproving thereof during
the session in which it is so laid upon the said Tables cease to have effect
on the day on which the last of such resolutions is passed.
6 BSRSA pt. 28 (2000). In terms of subsection 5(3), the Governor-General had the
power to order the removal of any Black who ignored a § 5(1) order. § 5(3) of Black
Administration Act 38 of 1927.
24 When blacks in the Cape were finally disenfranchised by the Representation of
Natives Act, the application of "Native" acts to all blacks in South Africa was
accomplished. Blacks were but mere occupiers of land and no longer owners.
Representation of Natives Act 12 of 1936 (repealed 1959).
25 Id.
26 Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 (repealed 1984). This Act
was further amended in the era of Verwoerd's reign as Minister of Native Affairs in the
early 1950s.
27 The identity document came to be called the "dompas." "Pas" would be
translated to mean "pass." If you had the document you could pass, that is, go on. In
Afrikaans "dom" means stupid.
28 § 23(l)(b) of Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945.
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continuously and lawfully in the urban areas for fifteen years, or
were employed by one employer for ten years or more, or were a
migrant labourer, or other. If other, you were summarily arrested,
prosecuted and sent either to a labour colony or permanently
"endorsed" out of the urban area.20
The Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act worked in
conjunction with the Population Registration Act 30 of 1950,
which racially classified every person in South Africa and
endorsed that classification in one's identity document.3" The Act
eliminated doubts as to a particular person's race for purposes of
the "Influx Control" Act. Thus, it was an offence for a black
person not to carry his or her "dompas" at all times,3' and failure to
produce them for a peace officer (policeman) on demand was
grounds for arrest. Those who were clearly not black, however,
were not required to carry any documentation as to their racial
identity.
These various pieces of legislation would later be "elevated"
into what has become known as grand apartheid, a time when the
government not only separated blacks from whites, but also sought
to separate blacks ethnically into different Bantustans or
homelands. After the homeland policy was established, the white
government claimed moral legitimacy on the grounds that no
single black ethnic group was larger than the white population.
Therefore, so the argument went, the imposition of white rule on
blacks was the will of the majority. Of course, the whites were not
being sorted into their different ethnic groups, such as English,
Afrikaner, German, Jew, Italian, Greek, and so on. Economic
realities dictated otherwise. Commerce and industry in the urban
areas required cheap labour, and through nefarious stratagems like
a heavy tax on livestock and restrictions on the number of
livestock that could be owned by blacks (under the pretext of
preserving grazing areas), the white government forced blacks
from rural to urban areas. Because the urban centers lay outside
the "scheduled" and "released" areas, blacks could not own land in
these areas. Under the terms of the Group Areas Act,32 vibrant
29 Id. § 29(2); Bennett, supra note 5, at 87.
30 §§ 1-24 of Population Registration Act 30 of 1950 (repealed 1991).
31 Bennett, supra note 5, at 87.
32 §§ 1-39 of Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 (repealed 1957).
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black residential areas like Sophiatown, Newclare, Cato Manor,
Lady Selbourne, and District Six were demolished and the people
forcibly moved from within the cities to locations outside the
cities. Black townships sprung up on the outskirts of cities and
towns while new laws ensured a total separation of the races
socially, economically, culturally, and residentially. The
workplace represented the only integrated location, and even there
blacks and whites had separate amenities such as toilets and eating
places.
The separation in urban areas was further accomplished by the
promulgation of the Group Areas Act.33 This Act proclaimed
certain areas as "reserved" for occupation by particular racial
groups. 4 Members of disqualified groups could not live, trade in,
or own land in the reserved area.35 This Act increasingly relegated
blacks to small houses owned by the municipalities and located far
from their places of employment. Blacks were expected to live in
these houses for as long as they provided cheap labour to white-
owned industry. Once they retired, or could not provide labour for
some reason, they were expected to relocate to their designated
rural areas, there to starve to death out of sight of the white man.
While this was the government's plan, people's movements
proved difficult to control and curtail. People naturally move
between rural and urban areas to visit relatives and friends. Many
looked for employment in order to obtain the privilege of living in
the urban areas.
The final objective of grand apartheid was to link each black in
South Africa with some homeland and then to deny blacks any
claim whatsoever to the urban areas. The government wanted
blacks to work in the white-owned factories, industries, and
offices by day and return to some homeland by night. Hence, some
urban townships such as Kwa-Mashu, Zwelitsha, and Mdantsane,
for example, were surreptitiously given to their respective
neighbouring homeland governments of Kwa-Zulu and Ciskei. In
addition to this policy, the Physical Planning Act encouraged




36 §§ 1-15 of Physical Planning Act 88 of 1967, 3 BSRSA pt. 11 (2000).
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employers who heeded the government's call received various
incentives such as tax rebates or outright subsidies. This practice
ensured that by crossing a street from work, a black employee
would be in a homeland by the time he or she arrived home.
Rural blacks also faced their share of forced removals. With
the consolidation of the homelands, black rural communities were
moved from established areas against their will and often dumped
in bare fields with nothing but military tents for shelter. There
would be no infrastructure such as roads, sewerage, electricity or
water, nor facilities and amenities like schools, hospitals, clinics,
or shops. The government forcibly moved many black
communities without compensation. In instances where families
received compensation, it usually constituted a small amount,
meant only for improvements and not for the land itself. On this
process of exclusion and dispossession, Professor John Dugard
noted:
Pretoria has set in motion the implementation of its ultimate
fantasy-a South Africa in which there are no black South
African nationals or citizens; a South Africa that cannot be
accused of denying civil political rights to its black nationals for
the simple reason that there will be no black South Africans,
only millions of migrant labourers (or guest workers, as the
fantasy sees them) linked by nationality to a collection of,
unrecognized, economically dependent mini-states on the
periphery of South Africa.37
Using its vast powers, the government separated black
communities and forced them to come together as strangers in
other parts of the country. Families were torn apart, never to meet
again. Apartheid policy disempowered and dehumanized black
people and inflicted untold pain, both physical and emotional, on
communities, families, and individuals. Writing in 1969, Cosmas
Desmond described the misery of those forced to relocate:
I have seen the bewilderment of simple rural people when they
are told they must leave their homes where they have lived for
generations and go to a strange place. I have heard their cries of
helplessness and resignation and their pleas for help. I have seen
the sufferings of whole families living in a tent or a tiny hut. Of
37 John Dugard, Denationalisation: Apartheid's Ultimate Plan, in AFRICA REPORT
July/August 1981, quoted in LAURINE PLATZKY & CHERRYL WALKER, THE SURPLUS
PEOPLE: FORCED REMOVALS IN SOUTH AFRICA 16 (1985).
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children sick with typhoid, or their bodies emaciated with
malnutrition and even dying of plain starvation. 8
It is estimated that between 1960 and 1983, the government
forcibly removed 3.5 million blacks. 9 In addition, a little over 1.9
million were under threat of removal in the rural areas alone.
Arrests under the influx control laws in the metropolitan areas
"increased from 117,518 in 1980 to 160,600 in 1981 and to
206,022 in 1982.""0
In the recent case of Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Peoples
Dialogue on Land & Shelter & Others,4' the Honourable J.P. Horn,
acting judge, stated:
The apartheid era saw the indiscriminate removal and
resettlement of families and whole communities. People were
relocated to areas where they had never been before and where
development was completely stultified. They were far removed
from schools, work places, transportation routes and cities. Until
1991 the land tenure system was based on race. A vast and
intricate system of land and tenure control emerged which made
drastic inroads on the common law and communal tenure rights.
A person's rights of tenure or where he could own or occupy
land were governed by legislation. (Compare the Group Areas
Act 36 of 1966.) The rights of blacks to occupy and own land
were stringently controlled by the Black Land Act 27 of 1913,
the Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936, the Blacks
(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 and the Black
Communities Development Act 4 of 1984. (citation omitted)
These statutes brought endless misery and strife to the black
population and virtually cast them as sojourners in their own
country. Any form of illegal occupation or squatting on land was
prohibited.4
38 COSMAS DESMOND, THE DISCARDED PEOPLE (1969), quoted in PLATZKY &
WALKER, supra note 37, at 7.
39 PLATZKY & WALKER, supra note 37, at 9.
40 Id. at 9 (quoting statistics from THE STAR newspaper from Feb. 23, 1982, and
statistics released by the South African Institute of Race Relations in 1982). There are no
figures for small towns.
41 2000 (2) SALR 1074 (SE).
42 Id. at 1082 (C-F). Cf. Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951.
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II. The Period Immediately Preceding April 1994
A. Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of
1991
The Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act repealed
the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts. 3 The land owned by the
Development Trust (i.e., "released" areas) was to vest in "an
Administrator, a Minister or the State."" The Group Areas Act
was also abolished. The Land Measures Act 108 of 1991 presented
the embryonic stage of the land restitution process. 5 When the
pillars of apartheid were knocked over in early 1991, few blacks
had reason to rejoice in the streets:
Two major reasons suggest themselves. "First ... nothing much
had changed. The children went off to their segregated schools.
The elderly went to collect their discriminatory pensions .... .
Secondly, the repeal of these Acts did nothing to reverse
generations of dispossession and discrimination. Those
physically dispossessed in the cities ... remained dispossessed,
without even a faint hope that the wrongs done in the past would
be reversed . . . . "Apartheid is not dead .. . [t]he social,
educational and economic inequalities created by apartheid
remain with us." Yet there has been a victory and a triumph.
Laws which have been roundly and rightly condemned
throughout the world as abuses of fundamental human rights,
and which have visited untold suffering on millions of people,
have been repealed. 46
B. Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991
The Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act introduced a
system to convert land tenure rights to full ownership. 7 Schedule 1
43 §§ 1-108 of Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991, 4
BSRSA pt. 21 (2000).
44 CAREY-MILLER & POPE, supra note 9, at 249 (citing § 12(2)(a) of Abolition of
Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991).
45 Id. at 250.
46 Geoff Budlender, The Pillars of Apartheid, 7 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. v, v-vi
(1991).
47 §§ 1-26 of Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991, 2 BSRSA pt. 5
(2000).
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of the Act contained a list of all tenure rights that would be
automatically upgraded in terms of section 2(1) of the Act.48 Other
rights could only be converted by registration. 9 According to the
1991 White Paper on Land Reform, this legislation was designed
to stimulate economic growth and the property market in
particular.
C. The Less Formal Township Establishment Act 113 of 1991
The Less Formal Township Establishment Act was passed to
address the ever-increasing need for housing." An estimate by the
Development Bank of Southern Africa in 1989 indicated that
seven million people lived in informal housing.' The practice of
occupying vacant land for residential purposes, without any
legally recognized right, has been going on for a very long time. In
the past, it was referred to as squatting. With the passage of this
Act, it has become known as informal occupation. Carey-Miller
calls this a paradigm shift from "the priority of the land title
holder's legal right to an acknowledgment of the interest of the
citizen denied access to housing both directly and, more
significantly, indirectly in the sense of exclusion from the
decision-making system of the state."52
III. The Period after April 1994
The two constitutions of South Africa that came into being
after 1994 laid the foundation for land reform. The first (the 1993
Interim Constitution) provided for land reform in a limited
way because it referred to restitution of land rights only in
sections 121, 122, and 123."3 These sections read as follows:
§ 121 Claims
(1) An Act of Parliament shall provide for matters relating
to the restitution of land rights, as envisaged in this section
48 Id.
49 CAREY-MILLER & POPE, supra note 9, at 255.
50 §§ 1-33 of Less Formal Township Establishment Act 113 of 1991, 5 BSRSA pt.
24 (2000).
51 CAREY-MILLER & POPE, supra note 9, at 266 n. 199,
52 Id. at 266-67.
53 S. AFR. CONST. ch. VIII, §§ 121-23 (1993).
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and in sections 122 and 123.
(2) A person or a community shall be entitled to claim
restitution of a right in land from the state if-
(a) such a person or community was dispossessed of
such right at any time after a date to be fixed by the Act
referred to in subsection (1); and
(b) such dispossession was effected under or for the
purpose of furthering the object of a law which would
have been inconsistent with the prohibition of racial
discrimination contained in section 8(2), had that section
been in operation at the time of such dispossession.
(3) The date fixed by virtue of subsection (2)(a) shall not be
a date earlier than 19 June 1913.
(4) (a) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any
rights in land expropriated under the Expropriation Act,
1975 (Act 63 of 1975), or any other law incorporating
by reference that Act, or the provisions of that Act with
regard to compensation, if just and equitable
compensation as contemplated in section 123(4) was
paid in respect of such expropriation.
(b) In this section "Expropriation Act, 1975" shall
include any expropriation law repealed by that Act.
(5) No claim under this section shall be lodged before the
passing of the Act contemplated in subsection (1).
(6) Any claims under subsection (2) shall be subject to such
conditions, limitations and exclusions as may be prescribed
by such Act, and shall not be justiciable by a court of law
unless the claim has been dealt with in terms of section 122
by the Commission established by that section.
§ 122 Commission
(1) The Act contemplated in section 121(1) shall establish a
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, which shall be
competent to-
(a) investigate the merits of any claims;
(b) mediate and settle disputes arising from such claims;
(c) draw up reports on unsettled claims for submission
as evidence to a court of law and to present any other
relevant evidence to the court; and
2001]
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(d) exercise and perform any such other powers and
functions as may be provided for in the said Act.
(2) The procedures to be followed for dealing with claims in
terms of this section shall be as prescribed by or under the
said Act.
§ 123 Court Orders
(1) Where a claim contemplated in section 121(2) is lodged
with a court of law and the land in question is-
(a) in the possession of the state and the state certifies
that the restoration of the right in question is feasible,
the court may, subject to subsection (4), order the state
to restore the relevant right to the claimant; or
(b) in the possession of a private owner and the state
certifies that the acquisition of such land by the state is
feasible, the court may, subject to subsection (4), order
the state to purchase or expropriate such land and
restore the relevant right to the claimant.
(2) The court shall not issue an order under subsection (1)(b)
unless it is just and equitable to do so, taking into account all
relevant factors, including the history of the dispossession,
the hardship caused, the use to which the property is being
put, the history of its acquisition by the owner, the interests
of the owner and others affected by any expropriation, and
the interests of the dispossessed: Provided that any
expropriation under subsection (1)(b) shall be subject to the
payment of compensation calculated in the manner provided
for in section 28(3).
(3) If the state certifies that any restoration in terms of
subsection (1)(a) or any acquisition in terms of subsection
(1)(b) is not feasible, or if the claimant instead of the
restoration of the right prefers alternative relief, the court
may, subject to subsection (4), order the state, in lieu of the
restoration of the said right-
(a) to grant the claimant an appropriate right in available
alternative state-owned land designated by the state to
the satisfaction of the court, provided that the state
certifies that it is feasible to designate alternative state-
owned land;
(b) to pay the claimant compensation; or
[Vol. 26
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(c) to grant the claimant any alternative relief.
(4) (a) The compensation referred to in subsection (3) shall
be determined by the court as being just and equitable,
taking into account the circumstances which prevailed at
the time of the dispossession and all such other factors
as may be prescribed by the Act referred to in section
121(1), including any compensation that was paid upon
such dispossession.
(b) If the court grants the claimant the relief
contemplated in subsection (1) or (3), it shall take into
account, and, where appropriate, make an order with
regard to, any compensation that was paid to the
claimant upon the dispossession of the right in
question. 4
The Constitution of 1996 (the final Constitution) expanded on the
concept of land reform by providing in the property clause as
follows:
§ 25 Property
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions
which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable
basis.
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally
insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or
practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of
Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to
comparable redress.
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19
June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or
practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of
Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to
equitable redress.55
The Government's land reform policy is based on the three
paragraphs of section 25 and, hence, has three elements:
redistribution of land rights, tenure security, and restitution of land
54 Id.
55 S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, § 25(5)-(7) (1996).
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rights. 6 A brief explanation of each of these policy elements
follows.
A. Redistribution
Redistribution is driven very much by the responsible Minister
of State. As can be expected, the responsible minister is the
Minister for Land Affairs. The approach here is that those people
who never had land of their own and who qualify for state subsidy
can apply to the Minister for such a subsidy for the purpose of
acquiring land or developing it. At times, the subsidy is given to
people who already have land or access to land, but who do not
have the resources to develop it. The amount of the subsidy is
R15,000.00, and the applicant family must qualify. The advantage
of this redistribution leg of the policy is its flexibility. The
minister uses it for people who apply for redistribution, but it can
also be used in respect to the other two elements of the policy. 7
For example, under the restitution facet, the Restitution of Land
Rights Act 22 of 1994 provides in section 6(2)(b) that, where a
claimant does not qualify for restitution, the regional land claims
commissioner may advise the Minister on the most appropriate
relief, if any, for the claimant. 8 Usually, the advice given is for the
minister to deal with the claimant in terms of the redistribution leg
of the policy.
Although the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996
(hereinafter Labour Tenants Act) is usually described as falling
under the security of tenure element of the policy, it also falls
under the redistribution leg by virtue of Chapter III thereof. 9 This
chapter provides that a labour tenant6° may apply for an award of
56 Id.
57 See id.
58 § 6(2)(b) of Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, 4 BSRSA pt. 21 (2000).
59 Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, 4 BSRSA pt. 21 (2000).
60 "[L]abour tenant" means a person-
(a) who is residing or has the right to reside on a farm;
(b) who has or has had the right to use cropping or grazing land on the farm,
referred to in paragraph (a), or another farm of the owner, and in consideration
of such right provides or has provided labour to the owner or lessee; and
(c) whose parent or grandparent resided or resides on a farm and had the use of
cropping or grazing land on such farm or another farm of the owner, and in
consideration of such right provided or provides labour to the owner or lessee of
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that portion of the owner's land that he has historically occupied
and used.6' The owner of the land would, of course, be
appropriately compensated for the award, and the money for the
purchase would come from the minister's funds for
redistribution.62 This method of redistribution has been used quite
often.
Similarly, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997
(ESTA) is also intended for tenure security and also has
redistribution elements.63 Section 4 of the Act provides for
subsidies from the Minister for the planning and implementation
of what are called on-site and off-site developments.' On-site and
off-site developments are really residential arrangements for the
occupier,65 either on or off the land of the owner. The major
limitation of this type of redistribution is that it is limited to
spouses and dependants of people over the age of sixty years.66 No
record could be found of this method ever having been used by
anybody since the Act's creation.
B. Tenure Security
A number of acts, some of which were alluded to above, are
such or such other farm, including a person who has been appointed a successor
to a labour tenant in accordance with the provisions of section 3 (4) and (5), but
excluding a farmworker ....
Id. § 1.
61 See id.
62 Id. § 23.
63 Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997, 4 BSRSA pt. 21 (2000).
- Id. § 4.
65 "[Olccupier" means a person residing on land which belongs to another person,
and who has or on 4 February 1997 or thereafter had consent or another right in law to
do so, but excluding-
(a) a labour tenant in terms of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act, 1996
(Act No. 3 of 1996); and
(b) a person using or intending to use the land in question mainly for industrial,
mining, commercial or commercial farming purposes, but including a person
who works the land himself or herself and does not employ any person who is
not a member of his or her family; and
(c) a person who has income in excess of the prescribed amount ....
Id. § 1.
66 Id. §§ 8(4)(a), (5).
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used to secure the tenure of people living under weak and
precarious tenure. These are the Labour Tenants Act,67 the ESTA, 8
and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE).69 Prior to the passage of
these three acts, evictions of people from land could take place
either pursuant to (1) contract, (2) the common law, or (3) statute
(e.g., the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951).7
Naturally, where contract regulates the parties' relationship,
eviction must take place according to the terms of the contract. For
various categories of black people, however, such as farmworkers,
labour tenants, sharecroppers, or ordinary occupiers, living on
white-owned farms, either the common law or the Prevention of
Illegal Squatting Act was used.7' Evictions were relatively easy to
obtain under these two methods. Under the common law it was
sufficient to show that the plaintiff/applicant was the owner, that
the defendant/respondent was on the land, and that the former
gave the latter notice to vacate. Similarly, once permission to stay
on the land was withdrawn, it was a simple matter to secure a
criminal conviction and eviction under the Prevention of Illegal
Squatting Act.72
These three acts-The Labour Tenants Act, ESTA, and PIE-
together with section 26(3) of the Constitution73 have affected the
common law in certain circumstances and caused the repeal of the
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act. These acts, to varying degrees,
prescribe certain procedures for securing an eviction that make it
more difficult than ever before to obtain one.
1. The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996
The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 grants
labour tenants protection against arbitrary eviction by permitting
eviction only in prescribed circumstances, pursuant to a court
67 Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, 4 BSRSA pt. 21 (2000).
68 Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997.
69 Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of
1998, 3 BSRSA pt. 9 (2000).
70 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 (repealed 1998).
71 Id.
72 Id.
13 S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, § 26(3) (1996).
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order issued by the Land Claims Court (LCC).4 The Labour
Tenants Act also grants labour tenants the right to apply for
ownership of that portion of the farm over which they have
historically had use rights.75 It is the task of the LCC to decide
whether such ownership rights should be granted, or whether the
granting of lesser rights or compensation would be more
appropriate. Where ownership is granted to labour tenants, farm
owners are entitled to fair compensation."6 It is the task of the LCC
to determine the amount of such compensation."
Great dissension in the ranks existed regarding the proper
interpretation of the definition of a labour tenant.78 Some argued
that the word "and" after subsection (b) need not be read
conjunctively.79 The LCC, however, determined that the various
subsections had to be read conjunctively."0 The Supreme Court of
Appeal, the highest court for non-constitutional issues, confirmed
the interpretation of the LCC.' An interpretation of "such farm" in
subsection (c) was given as being any farm, not just a farm
belonging to the owner of the land referred to in subsections (a)
and (b). 2 This means that more people could qualify as labour
tenants and, hence, for the protection afforded by the Act. This
interpretation was accepted by the Supreme Court of Appeal: 3
I am of the view that the change from "the" farm to "a" farm in
the definition cannot be ignored, i.e., that "a" cannot simply be
replaced by "the." The same reasoning which I have applied
earlier in this judgment in respect of "and" and "or" would seem
14 Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, 4 BSRSA pt. 21 (2000).
75 Id. § 16.
76 Id. § 23.
77 Id. § 23(2)-(3).
78 Id. § 1.
79 Tselentis Mining (Pty.) Ltd. & Another v. Mdlalose & Others, 1998 (1) SALR
411 (N) (a judgment of Judge Meskin in the High Court in Kwa-Zulu Natal); Salimba v.
Ngcobo & Others, (unreported judgment of Judge Hurt in Kwa-Zulu Natal case 340/96
handed down on November 4, 1997). Overturned on appeal, see n.45.
80 Ngcobo & Another v. van Rensburg & Others, 1999 (2) SALR 525 (LCC), 1997
(4) AIISA 537 (LCC).
1I Ngcobo & Others v. Salimba CC and Ngcobo v. van Rensburg, 1999 (2) SALR
1059 (SCA).
82 § 1 of Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996.
83 Ngcobo & Others, 1999 (2) SALR at 1059.
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to be applicable .... The object of the Act was to give a wide
and equitable protection to labour tenants without ignoring the
rights of the owners of farms. This balance can be achieved more
justly and equitably by adhering to the text of paragraph (c) of
the definition, rather than by substituting "the" for "a" farm.
84
The judge writing the opinion explained further:
It is important to keep in mind that the Act was intended to
reform the legal relationship that had prevailed between the
owner of a farm and labour tenants since the apartheid era.
Under that regime, the "rights" of those who served an owner in
return for the privilege of working and grazing pieces of land for
their own benefit were as illusory as they were precarious. These
labour tenants occupied the land at the whim of the landowner,
who could eject them subject only to compliance with the
common-law requirement of reasonable notice. In our country,
land ownership was effectively beyond the reach of the majority
of black people-people who were, because of the apartheid
system and its concomitant discriminatory education system,
kept in ignorance even of their rudimentary rights. Rural people
had little choice but to become either farmworkers, with no
prospect of building up even a minuscule estate, or tenant
labourers, with no legal protection of their tenancy. The last
group was thus reduced to feudal dependency: they had either to
comply with the orders of the landowner, even if harsh and
unjust, or face the prospect of nomadic trekking and seeking, in
an unsympathetic environment, new land to occupy.
85
The Honorable P.J.J. Olivier, judge of appeal of the Supreme
Court of Appeal commented on the "bad and slovenly
draftsmanship of the Act."86 Unfortunately, it is not the only area
where poor draftsmanship has led the landowners on a merry
dance. 87
2. Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997
The government passed the Extension of Security of Tenure
Act in November 1997 to protect non-urban occupiers of land
84 Id. at 1072-73.
85 Id. at 1069.
86 Id.
87 See infra text accompanying notes 88-100.
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(other than labour tenants) against arbitrary eviction."8 It provides
for eviction only in certain circumstances. Under the common law,
all that the landowner needed to allege was that he (or she) was the
owner and was entitled to possession. Ross v. South Peninsula
Municipality discussed the allegations required in order to secure
an eviction under the common law.89 The Court held that section
26(3) of the 1996 Constitution had amended the common law.90
ESTA gives parties a choice of court. The parties may
approach a magistrate's court, the LCC, or, if both parties consent,
a high court. ESTA does, however, make the LCC the final arbiter
as far as these three courts are concerned. It provides that all
eviction orders granted by magistrates must go on automatic
review to the LCC. It further provides that whenever a high court
is required to interpret ESTA, the proceedings must be stopped
and referred to the LCC. It is important to note that cases can still
be appealed from the LCC to the Supreme Court of Appeal, and in
appropriate cases, to the Constitutional Court.
ESTA is a poorly drafted piece of legislation. The number of
cases that the reviewing court (the LCC) has had to send back due
to procedural errors is testimony to this. Moreover, Parliament, via
piecemeal amendments for every statutory loophole, increases the
difficulty on affected parties to protect their rights. These
problems are not lessened by the fact that people on the ground
seem to have the notion that occupiers in terms of ESTA have
permanent land rights. This notion, being put into the heads of the
frequently poorly educated and illiterate people, often works to
their great detriment. They have been advised that ESTA gives
them permanent land rights. Consequently, they behave in a
fashion that jeopardises their right of residence. This is especially
true of employees who are encouraged or threatened into
becoming involved in illegal strikes and who then find themselves
not only without employment but without homes as well. The
Government needs to embark on a massive campaign to educate
occupiers about their rights and duties.
Returning then to the piecemeal approach adopted by the
legislature, section 9(3) is a new addition to ESTA, which, though
88 Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997, 4 BSRSA pt. 21 (2000).
89 2000 (I) SALR 589 (CC), 2000 (4) AIISA 85 (CC).
90 Id.
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laudable in purpose, has added even more confusion to an already
confused piece of legislation. The section provides that:
For the purposes of subsection 2(c),9 the Court must request a
probation officer contemplated in section 1 of the Probation
Services Act, 1991 (Act No. 116 of 1991), or an officer of the
department or any other officer in the employment of the State,
as may be determined by the Minister, to submit a report within
a reasonable period-
(a) on the availability of suitable alternative accommodation
to the occupier;
(b) indicating how an eviction will affect the constitutional
rights of any affected person, including the rights of the
children, if any, to education;
(c) pointing out any undue hardships which an eviction
would cause the occupier; and
91 § 9(l)-(2) of Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. Paragraphs (1)
and (2) of section 9 provide:
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, an occupier may be evicted
only in terms of an order of court issued under this Act.
(2) A court may make an order for the eviction of an occupier if-
(a) the occupier's right of residence has been terminated in terms of
section 8;
(b) the occupier has not vacated the land within the period of notice given
by the owner or person in charge;
(c) the conditions for an order for eviction in terms of section 10 or 11 have
been complied with; and
(d) the owner or person in charge has, after the termination of the right of
residence, given-
(i) the occupier;
(ii) the municipality in whose area ofjurisdiction the land in question is
situated; and
(iii) the head of the relevant provincial office of the Department of
Land Affairs, for information purposes, not less than two calendar
months' written notice of the intention to obtain an order for eviction,
which notice shall contain the prescribed particulars and set out the
grounds on which the eviction is based: Provided that if a notice of
application to a court has, after the termination of the right of
residence, been given to the occupier, the municipality and the head of
the relevant provincial office of the Department of Land Affairs not
less than two months before the date of the commencement of the
hearing of the application, this paragraph shall be deemed to have been
complied with.
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(d) on any other. matter as may be prescribed. 9
Judges of the court differ on whether such a report must be
obtained if a long-term occupier (i.e., a person who was an
occupier on or before February 4, 1997) has done something to
cause his loss of occupation rights.93 Prior to the addition of
section 9(3), alternative accommodation was not necessary in such
a case. One view holds that, as there were no constitutional rights
that would be affected and as hardship need not enter the picture in
such a case, a section 9(3) report would add nothing to the
information before the court and need not be obtained.94 Another
view argues for the submission of the section 9(3) report even in
the circumstances of section 10(1):
I would have thought that one of the most important factors to
consider when determining the justice and equity of an eviction
would be hardship. That does not mean that an occupier is
entitled to disregard the fact that the property belongs to the land
owner. It simply means that even in a section 10(1) eviction the
hardship an eviction will cause must nonetheless be considered.
92 Id. § 9(3).
93 Id. § 10(1). Section 10(1) provides:
An order for the eviction of a person who was an occupier on 4 February 1997
may be granted if-
(a) the occupier has breached section 6(3) and the court is satisfied that the
breach is material and that the occupier has not remedied such breach;
(b) the owner or person in charge has complied with the terms of any
agreement pertaining to the occupier's right to reside on the land and has
fulfilled his or her duties in terms of the law, while the occupier has
breached a material and fair term of the agreement, although reasonably
able to comply with such term, and has not remedied the breach despite
being given one calendar month's notice in writing to do so;
(c) the occupier has committed such a fundamental breach of the
relationship between him or her and the owner or person in charge, that it is
not practically possible to remedy it, either at all or in a manner which
could reasonably restore the relationship; or
(d) the occupier-
(i) is or was an employee whose right of residence arises solely from
that employment; and
(ii) has voluntarily resigned in circumstances that do not amount to a
constructive dismissal in terms of the Labour Relations Act.
14 Westminster Produce (Pty.) Ltd. t/a Elgin Orchards v. Simons & Another, 2000
(3) AIISA 279 (LCC).
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In a section 10(1) situation it is likely that the most the hardship
aspect will do is delay the inevitability of an eviction to
minimise the hardship the occupier and his family will suffer. I
wish to express my concem that the Legislature saw fit to
require a report dealing only with the hardship that the occupier
may suffer. I see no reason why the hardship the land owner
may suffer if the eviction is not granted should not be mentioned
in the report. In fact it would be of great assistance to the court if
the independent person preparing the report also investigated
this aspect. Of course the court is at liberty to call for evidence
from the landowner on this aspect once the section 9(3) report
arnves.9
The latter view has been expressed in yet another case.96 This
difference of opinion makes it even harder for the magistrates,
usually the judicial officers of first instance, to know whether or
not to request such a report.
Add to this confusion the fact that section 9(3) was inserted
into the legislation without proper consultation and one finds that
"probation officers" who are under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Justice, not the Department of Land Affairs (DLA),
refuse to accept the additional burden of preparing such reports.
The DLA has since designated the Director of the Provincial
Office of the DLA to prepare these reports. Very few section 9(3)
reports are being obtained, but not for want of trying. The need to
obtain an independent report is pressing. Once the minister
appoints the necessary additional staff to prepare the requested
report in a timely manner, such a report will have a valuable role
to play, especially in undefended matters. Meanwhile the LCC has
held that if a reasonable time has lapsed and no report is
forthcoming, there is no need to wait indefinitely for the report.97
This is an unfortunate state of affairs considering the important
role such a report plays.
Deputy Judge President Flemning also raised the issue of
constitutionality in Joubert v. van Rensburg on October 3, 2000:98
91 Valley Packers Coop. Ltd. v. Dietloff, LCC 84R/00, para. 8 (2000).
96 Glen Elgin Trust v. Titus & Another, LCC 81R/00 (2000).
97 Holt Leisure Park (Pty.) Ltd. v. Josephs & Another, LCC 62R/00 (2000).
98 2000 W.L.D. 13735/00.
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36.1 Some interventions and discriminations of the Tenure
Act are packaged as if they are protective of that which in fact
required no additional statute.
36.2 Section 5 commences by stating rights which would have
existed in any event. Section 5 adds nothing to the Constitution.
It subtracts. The constitutional right to privacy must now tolerate
hordes of "unlawful" occupiers who are protected by the Tenure
Act.
36.3 An occupier is as a starting point entitled to nothing more
than that which was explicitly, tacitly or impliedly agreed.
Section 6 is not there to confirm that. It exists to move towards
the opposite pole. If the contract provides less, the right to
contractual freedom and to choice of association yields. The
occupier who bargains for nothing more than that which in
common law becomes a tenant or licensee, may now take the
owner's limited supply of water. Never mind the owner, the
cattle or the crops.
36.4 An occupier is given a "right to security of tenure"
(section 6(2)(a)) over another's property. Ownership has to yield
to this right. In terms of choice of words the point of departure is
again apparently an established one: a right to residence may
still be terminated on "any lawful ground." But then lawful
grounds are made inadequate. Any (lawful) ground of
termination is subjected to a very severe qualification the
terminal effect of which is that the right of residence may only
be brought to an end if there is alongside a lawful ground to do
so also something which makes termination "just and equitable."
Section 8(1).
37.1.1 "Just and equitable" from whose point of view? The
immediate response ought to be that the fairness at least to every
party must be considered. Also that of an occupier's child who
is an invalid? And if the plight of the occupier's child is
relevant, what about the child of the owner who is a quadriplegic
and who needs better income from the property to care for the
child?
37.1.2 There is no guideline for "just and equitable." "Just and
equitable" will in the particular field vary according to the
presiding individual's personal make-up, life experience, and
views about socio-political matters. It amounts to an unguided
missile.
37.1.3 The statute gives no special attention to what is fair to the
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owner. It does force fairness in favour of the occupier. It does so
by requiring that certain factors weigh in the equation even if on
normal logic they would not affect fairness.
37.1.4 It is decreed that fairness be guided inter alia by the
"existence of a reasonable expectation of the renewal of the
agreement" although the owner has no control over the thinking
of the occupier.
37.1.5 Giving lawful rights their due is subjected to
"comparative hardship" between owner and occupier. Unless
one subscribes to the belief that every owner in a rural area has
things easy, in fact has things so easy that he ought to lose
whatever one or more occupiers decide to take, the party with
legal rights must take the knock merely because, on a relative
basis, the grabbing party will in some degree suffer some greater
hardship. In the result the teacher who sub-let a holiday
bungalow on a farm can not get rid of the insolvent who moved
in for a month's hire.
37.2.1 The statute goes further. If occupation has endured for
ten years, no termination at all is possible if the occupier is older
than 60 years unless specified breaches occur. Why?
37.2.2 Bearing in mind that non-payment of rental is always of a
nature which can be remedied, the Tenure Act creates an
indefinite lease. If no rental was payable the statutory creation is
more like a servitude-unilaterally taken. A person who was
tolerated from the kindness of the heart for 10 years acquires a
permanent right as a birthday gift for turning sixty. Why? On the
death of that occupier the lease or other arrangements endure for
at least twelve months in favour of a relative. Why? Answers
may have followed if protection had been made dependent upon
a basis of occupation which points to some unfairness of ending
occupation. The statute does not do that. Once the Tenure Act
creates a wide net and itself gives no justification for limiting its
wording along logical lines, limitation can only find a level with
some fairness by way of the discretion of a presiding officer
who must try to import a limit which Parliament did not or could
not disclose. How come that a magistrate determines ad hoc
what Parliament might have wanted to say?
37.3.1 Even if an owner has overcome the overriding rights to
(unlawful) tenure which I have mentioned, an order for
ejectment is prohibited unless additional requirements are met.
One of these is that there must be at least two months' notice to
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a local authority (section 9(2)(d)(ii)). Then sections 10 and 11
imply that some unlawful occupiers may not be removed unless
the court forms an opinion that ejectment is "just and equitable."
The owner is made dependent inter alia upon the question
whether the occupier has "suitable alternative accommodation"
available. Cf. section 1 1(3)(a). Ownership is again overridden by
the right of unlawful occupation unless and until e.g. a local
authority has the funds and the willingness to take the intruder
off the owner's hands. The effect is, of course, that unless a
local authority or someone else provides, the owner of the land
chosen by the occupier pays the price in the interests of society
out of his personal pocket. The Tenure Act protects relationships
with as little inherent "equitable" quality as when an
unintelligent student decides to go to university and then
chooses my bank account to pay the price.
37.4 An owner who eventually succeeds in obtaining an order,
is then burdened inter alia by a duty to pay compensation. Had
it been a common law approach of enforcing contractual
arrangements or being guided by enrichment-impoverishment,
the statute need not have decreed anything. The court must,
however, not determine whether there is a duty to compensate
but only the extent. That is to be assessed by the court's view of
what is "just and equitable." By a subjective opinion in which
the factors mentioned in section 13(1) and 13(2) must play a
role. The statute has in mind the costs to the occupier and not
whether the owner derives benefit. Section 13(2). The court may
subject ownership to the arrival of the end of the crop gathering
season. Section 3(c)(2)(a) [sic]. Never mind that one person is
unlawfully (in law and even according to what is just and
equitable) in occupation of another's property and is unlawfully
deriving farming benefit therefrom. 99
The poor draftsmanship of ESTA raises another concern.
There is an obvious but illogical distinction between the treatment
of section 10 and section 11 occupiers. In the case of section
10(1), the legislation clearly seeks to diminish the protection
afforded to a longer-term occupier. The importance of alternative
accommodation has less weight if the longer-term occupier
misbehaves. On the other hand, there is no mention of any censure
for misbehaviour in section 11 situations. This is absurd especially
99 Id.
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when one considers that the section 11 occupier would have been
on the land for a lesser time than a section 10 occupier.
Another obvious problem with the review process is that in
most cases the process depends upon the magistrate sending the
papers to the LCC for review. A close look at the LCC review
register will reveal that very few of more than 260 magisterial
districts have ever sent their evictions for review. It is very
doubtful that all the evictions that have been granted have found
their way to the LCC.' °° Some nongovernmental organizations
have monitored the evictions in their areas and various requests
have come from outsiders for a particular eviction to be reviewed.
It is unclear, without further information, whether the failure to
send the papers for review is based on the fact that the evictions
are being granted under the common law, and thus not reviewable,
or being incorrectly granted under other legislation, or whether
section 19(3) is being ignored intentionally by the magistrates.
3. Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998
The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act (PIE) affords protection against arbitrary
eviction to people who occupy another's land without the latter's
permission.'"' The genesis of the Act can be traced to section 26(3)
of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996. Section 26(3) reads: "No one
may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished,
without an order of court made after considering all the relevant
circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions."'' 2
Unlike all the other acts on land reform, PIE is not justiciable in
the LCC, but in the magistrate's court and High Court.' °
00 Nineteen cases were sent for review in 1998, seventy-nine cases in 1999, and
106 cases in 2000.
101 Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of
1998, 3 BSRSA pt. 9 (2000).
02 S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, § 26(3) (1996).
03 § I of Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act
19 of 1998.
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The purpose of PIE was set out by the Honourable J.P. Horn,
acting judge, in Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Peoples Dialogue
on Land & Shelter & Others:'
The preamble to the Act spells out what the Legislature sought
to achieve. The Act seeks to protect the cardinal rights of
inhabitants of so-called informal settlements to share in the
constitutional right to housing and accommodation. It does not
want to see people evicted from their homes without the
intervention of the court. This can only happen once certain
prescribed requirements have been met by the landowner and all
the relevant circumstances of the situation have been taken into
account by the court.105
PIE is commendable in a society where there has been so
much abuse of those with less power and money. What I do not
understand is the fact that various separate acts all dealing with
property rights have had to be promulgated. It has created much
confusion. For example, why is a PIE eviction not reviewable by
the LCC? The only distinction between a person protected by
ESTA and a person falling under PIE is the consent of the
landowner. Should this merit such a divergence in treatment?
Jurisdictional problems often arise where a case comes to the LCC
on the misunderstanding that it falls within ESTA. These problems
often result in unnecessary delays in finalising the case and
escalation of costs. These concerns have been raised in our
judgments, but the legislature, in its wisdom, has seen fit to do
nothing about the matter.
C. Restitution
The third and last element of the policy of land reform is called
restitution. This process is regulated in terms of the Restitution of
Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 (the Restitution Act). °6 This Act was
enacted pursuant to the provisions of sections 121 to 123 of the
Interim Constitution"7 to flesh out the constitutional framework for
restitution.' 8 Any person who, or any community which was,
104 2000 (2) SALR 1074 (SE).
105 Id. at 1083 (A-B).
106 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, 4 BSRSA pt. 21 (2000).
107 See S. AFR. CONST. ch. VIII, §§ 121, 123 (1993).
108 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994.
2001]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
dispossessed of a right in land as a result of a racially
discriminatory law or practice has a right to claim restitution of
that right against the State.
To qualify for a claim under the Act, which claim must be
made against the State, the following requirements must be
satisfied. There must have been: (a) a dispossession of a right in
land; (b) due to racially discriminatory laws or practices; (c) after
June 19, 1913; (d) the claim must be lodged not later than
December 31, 1998; and (e) just and equitable compensation must
not have been paid at time of dispossession. '9
The Blacks Land Act 27 of 1913 referred to in the background
history above was the first national act to regulate land in a
discriminatory manner and was promulgated on June 19, 1913."10
This explains the requirement that the dispossession must have
taken place after June 19, 1913. This does not mean that there
were no racially motivated dispossessions prior to June 19, 1913,
but that such dispossessions would have taken place in terms of
other provincial laws or even brute force. Any such dispossessions
are dealt with in terms of the redistribution element as explained
above.
Why there is a deadline by which the claims must be lodged is
not clear, particularly given that the majority of prospective
claimants are unlettered people staying in rural areas where
information travels slowly, if at all. The first deadline was April
30, 1998, but was extended to December 31, 1998. Even after the
later date, one still comes across people who plan to claim,
blissfully unaware of the fact that the deadline has come and gone.
With respect to the Restitution Act, claims are to be lodged
with any of the regional offices of the Commission on Restitution
of Land Rights. The Commission's role is to assist the claimants
to present the claims, investigate the merits of the claims and
attempt to settle them through mediation."' Once the claim has
been settled, the Commission, together with the Minister, make an
award that concludes the matter."2 Where the claim is not settled,
109 Id. § 2.
10 Blacks Land Act 27 of 1913 (repealed 1991).
1 § 6(1) of Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994.
112 Id. Previously, the Commission was obliged to submit the settlement to the LCC
for approval and to be made an order of Court.
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the Commission must compile a report to which all documents
found in the investigation must be annexed and submitted to the
LCC for adjudication. The Commission's report stands as a
statement of the case before the court and all parties to the claim
must then respond to the recommendations therein."3
The functions of the LCC under the Restitution Act include the
determination of any claim to restitution of a right in land.
"Restitution of a right in land" means "(a) the restoration of a right
in land; or (b) equitable redress." Equitable redress is defined as:
any equitable redress, other than the restoration of a right in
land, arising from the dispossession of a right in land after 19
June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or
practices, including-
(a) the granting of an appropriate right in alternative state-
owned land;
(b) the payment of compensation."'4
Where compensation is payable, either to a claimant or to a current
owner who is being expropriated, it is also the task of the LCC to
determine the quantum of such compensation.'
Judicial process is by its very nature slow and can be
protracted. Coupled with an initial investigation by the
Commission, it makes the process of investigating and
determining the claim even slower. When there was public
concern about the pace of the restitution process, the Act was
amended by the Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment
Act 63 of 1997 to allow claimants to approach the LCC directly
without first going to the Commission. If claimants choose this
option they must do all the necessary investigative and preparatory
work before submitting a claim to the court. This amendment was
introduced in an attempt to expedite the land restitution process.
Very few, if any, direct access claims have been lodged with the
court since the amendment.
While it may be slow, the judicial process, as opposed to an
administrative one, has the distinct advantage of credibility and
legitimacy, phenomena which are very important in a situation
"13 § 14 of Restitution Land Rights Act 22 of 1994.
114 Id. § 1.
115 Id. § 35(b).
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where freedom was won at a negotiating table and not on the
battlefield. Other problems beside the slow pace are associated
with the restitution process. These include:
lack of co-ordination between the restitution process and the
planning, budgeting and development programmes of provincial
government;
shortage of land;
absence of proper planning before the resettlement of the land;
disputes over entitlement to membership of the community; and
a shortage of skills and resources needed to redevelop the land."6
What sort of problems have been experienced by those who have
enjoyed the legal benefit of restoration?
This brings us to the most pressing and painful part of the
problem-which is that the moment of return to the land cannot
live up to the expectations and hopes generated by it. For of
course what was lost can never be returned. Part of the problem
is the fact that the land is not the only thing that was lost. What
was destroyed through ... removals was a whole way of being,
a set of community relations, a system of authority and let [us]
not forget, a broader system of economic relations and
livelihoods of which the land was but a part, and which gave it
its function and its value. The terrible truth of Restitution has
thus been that the moment of return to the land is often a
moment of disappointment and anti-climax. To settle on the spot
from which one's forebears-or even a younger, more vigorous,
more hopeful self-were once removed, is not necessarily to
return to that more authentic, more dignified, more hopeful
mode of existence. As we have seen in numerous cases, from
Riemvasmaak and Elandskloof to Doornkop and Ratsegae, to
return from exile to the promised land is to return to face the
complex, dispiriting and painful problems in the new South
Africa once again in new and often more intractable ways. For
116 Du Toit, The End of Restitution: Getting Real About Land Claims (July 26-28,
1999) (unpublished paper prepared for Land and Agrarian Reform Conference, Pretoria);
see also Lund, Lessons from Riemvasmaak for Land Reform Policies and Programmes in
South Africa Volume 2: Background Study (Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies,
University of the Western Cape, Bellville and FARM-Africa, London 1998) at 14-15;
Mayson et al., Elandskloof Land Restitution: Establishing Membership of a Communal
Property Association, in Proceedings of the International Conference on Land Tenure in
the Developing World with a Focus on Southern Africa 27-29 January 1998.
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communities have grown, services are needed and the rural and
national economies that made certain forms of existence
possible may no longer be in place. If existence without piped
water and electricity was acceptable in the past, it is no longer
so-and these services have to be paid for, and paid for in a very
different, increasingly globalised, economy. In all too many
cases, we may be looking at a scenario where the land is
returned to those who lost it-only to be lost again to the banks,
or to those who are willing to pay good cash for it .... This is
not to suggest that the project of restoration or return is pointless
and should be given up. The moment of the [realisation of the
implications of returning] is of course potentially an immensely
fruitful one. It can be the moment at which reality, however
painful it is, is accepted, and at which a more modest, more
grounded process of decision making can start on new terrain.
But this is very difficult, not least because it must involve a final
and full acceptance of the difficulties of the present. And
negotiating this transition requires forms of practice-and forms
of support-which have not thus far been made available to
claimants or implementors."7
In order to counteract some of the aforementioned problems,
the LCC sought in Kranspoort Community concerning the Farm
Kranspoort... to ensure that the restitution (and upgrading of land
rights) did not fall victim to such tragedy. The court put in place
what it considered to be safeguards against the unsustainable
depletion of non-renewable resources, as well as conditions upon
the forming of the Community Property Association."9
If what I have been saying sounds too gloomy, I quote the
following passage from the website of the DLA by way of
statistical information and for your comfort:
A deadline for the lodgement of claims was set at the 31
December 1998 [sic] and the Department embarked on a major
communications drive to ensure that all people who were
victims of forced removals knew that they needed to claim, and
where they could go to claim. The results were astounding and
63,455 claims have been lodged (the Commission is still
processing claims so the final number may change; also note
"7 Du Toit, supra note 116, at 14-15.
118 2000 (2) SALR 124 (LCC).
119 Id. para. 123.
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that this number reflects both individual and group claims and so
does not reflect the actual number of people claiming
restitution). Approximately 80% of these claims are for urban
areas and the majority of these will be for financial
compensation .... Since 1995, 241 claims have been finalised
representing the restoration of 311,484 hectares to 13,584
households (that is 83,378 beneficiaries). The Department has
spent R60 million in settling these claims (financial
compensation and purchase of land) .... A further 4,365 claims
have been gazetted (that means they have been verified and
work is being done on settling them), 284 have been rejected
and another 200 are nearing completion either through the Land
Claims Court or a fast track out-of-court settlement procedure
... . Concerned with the slow pace of delivery, the Minister
instituted a review of the restitution process in June last year
which has recommended far reaching changes that will make
this year the year of Delivery in Restitution . . . . The White
Paper on South African Land Policy outlined time frames for the
resolution of restitution as follows: 3 years for lodgement of
claims; 5 years for processing claims and 10 years for
implementing agreements. 120
D. The Holding of Property
In line with the protection of property rights in the
Constitution 12 and with a view to securing tenure rights, the
Communal Property Association Act 28 of 1996 was enacted
(CPA Act).'22 This Act can be used where a community either has
land restored to it or has applied for an award of land it has been
occupying, or for an on-site or off-site development respectively
under the Restitution Act, Labour Tenants Act, and ESTA. I deal
with this Act last because it straddles the entire spectrum of
restitution, redistribution, and tenure security.
Prior to the implementation of this Act, a community could
only own land under very limited circumstances. One method was
by common or joint ownership, which required inclusion of all
120 Department of Land Affairs, South Africa, Lind Reform in South Africa, at
http://land.pwv.gov.za/briefin2.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2001).
21 S. AFR. CONST. ch. 1I, § 25 (1996).
122 Communal Property Association Act 28 of 1996, 5 BSRSA pt. 24 (2000).
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names on the title deed.' 23 The trust represented another method.
But it bore the disadvantage of land vesting in trustees who were
not necessarily the beneficiaries of the trust. Finally, there was the
option of creating a juristic personality. Clearly, this limitation
ignored the realities of the African tradition of communal living.
The purpose of the CPA Act is "[t]o enable communities to form
juristic persons, to be known as communal property associations in
order to acquire, hold and manage property on a basis agreed to by
members of a community in terms of a written constitution; and to
provide for matters connected therewith."'
24
Obviously the legislature did not consider the existing forms of
juristic personality as adequate. The main reasoning appears to
have been the cost and the complexity of those systems. The new
juristic personality does not, however, replace the old options, but
merely adds to them. For example, section 2(3) of the CPA Act
expressly provides for a "similar entity" to apply to the minister in
order to have the various sections of the CPA Act apply to it.'25 A
similar entity is defined as "a trust, association of persons or
company registered in terms of section 21 of the Companies Act,
1973 (Act No. 61 of 1973). "26
Communities need ministerial approval in order to form a
communal property association (CPA). The community will have
to convince the minister that it is disadvantaged and that approval
is in the public interest.' 27 The similar entity needs to apply for
exemption from compliance with some of the provisions of the
CPA Act if it does not wish to follow all the formalities of the Act.
With respect to the legislature, it seems as if the plans to
implement a new system because the old one was too complex
have failed.
Drawing up the register of intended members for the
Elandskloof community, which was the first to receive its land
back under the Restitution of Land Rights Act ... took three
years to finalise .... Difficulties encountered included deciding
on the acceptable extent of family affiliation and eligibility,
123 CAREY-MILLER & POPE, supra note 9, at 467, 470.
124 Pmbl. of Communal Property Association Act 28 of 1996.
125 Id. § 2(3).
126 1d. § 1.
127 CAREY-MILLER & POPE, supra note 9, at 467-69,
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concerns about pressure on available space ...and access to
state subsidies .. . .The latter two concerns are somewhat in
conflict in that, on the one hand, it would appear to be desirable
to have as many families as possible involved because the
subsidy is available on a family basis, while, on the other, it
would be undesirable to overcrowd and thus threaten the
viability of subsistence if the resultant plots were to be very
small.'28
The CPA also has to comply with certain principles.12' A CPA
needs to be aware that it may approach the Director-General in
terms of section 6(1) to ask for assistance in the drafting of a
constitution."'3 This service will be invaluable but must not be seen
as replacing the will of the community.
E. Commentary on the Land Reform Laws
The effect of the land reform laws has been somewhat mixed.
In some cases it has resulted in cooperation between white farm
owners and black farm occupiers. In other situations it has resulted
in the most acrimonious court cases and, in worst cases, in violent
mutual attacks. Thankfully, the latter unpleasant method of
resolving the problem occurs in far fewer cases than where
cooperation is shown.
An example of the strong feelings about the land reform laws
is perhaps best illustrated in the case brought by a union of white
farm owners in which they challenged the constitutionality of the
Restitution Act.'3 ' The Transvaal Agricultural Union argued, inter
alia, that section 11 (1) of the Restitution Act contravened the most
basic principle of law, the audi alteram partem: "The main
objection, and the one primarily relied upon by the applicant as the
basis for its contention that landowners have been prejudiced by
the legislation, is that no provision is made in the statute for
regional land claims commissioners to hear owners before issuing
a section 1(1) notice. '
128 Id. at 471.
129 § 9 of Communal Property Association Act 28 of 1996.
130 Id. § 6(1).
'3' Transvaal Agric. Union v. Minister of Land Affairs & Another, 1997 (2) SALR
621 (CC).
132 Id. at 630.
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Section 11 deals with procedures that must be followed in
processing claims for restitution. Persons or communities claiming
restitution of land are required to complete a prescribed form, in
which a description of the land and the nature of the right being
claimed must be given, and to lodge the form at a regional office
of the Commission. The regional land claims commissioner, if he
or she is satisfied that the claim has been lodged in the prescribed
manner, is not frivolous or vexatious, and that no order has been
made by the LCC in respect to that piece of land, must cause
notice of the claim to be published in the Gazette. Once the notice
has been published in the Gazette, the commissioner is required by
section 11(6) to advise the owner of the land and any other party
which, in his or her opinion, might have an interest in the claim, of
the publication of the notice,'33 and instruct the Registrar of Deeds
to note on the deeds office records the fact that a claim for
restitution of a right in the land has been instituted.
There are very important consequences for a landowner:
A decision to publish a notice of the claim in the Gazette has
certain consequences. Sections 11 (7)(b) and (c) provide that no
claimant who was resident on the land in question at the date of
commencement of the Act may be evicted from the land, and no
improvement on the land may be removed or destroyed, without
the written authority of the Chief Land Claims Commissioner.
Section 11(8) empowers a regional land claims commissioner
who "has reason to believe that any improvement on the land is
likely to be removed, damaged or destroyed or that any person
resident on such land may be adversely affected as a result of the
publication of such notice" to authorise officials or delegates of
the Commission to enter upon the land to draw up an inventory
of assets on the land, a list of persons employed or resident
thereon, and to report on the "agricultural condition of the land
and of any excavations, mining or prospecting thereon.'
13 4
The Constitutional Court did not decide this important question,
but indicated that the solution was one that the Supreme Court
would have to decide. It did however give a few tips as to how the
Supreme Court would have to consider the issue.
133 § 11 (6) of Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, 4 BSRSA pt. 21 (2000).
'34 Transvaal Agric. Union v. Minister of Land Affairs & Another, 1997 (2) SALR
621, 627-28 (CC).
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In deciding whether the constitutional requirement that there
be procedurally fair administrative action calls for notice to be
given by regional land claims commissioners to the landowners
before issuing a section 1(1) notice, or whether their interests are
sufficiently protected by notice given to them after such claims
have been accepted, various matters would have to be considered
by the court. Without attempting to lay down what will be
involved in such an enquiry, it seems clear that a court would have
to weigh up the interests of the claimants against those of the
landowners, and consideration would have to be given to issues
such as the temporary nature of the impediment; the purpose
served by the status quo provision of section 11(7); the need for
expedition in securing that purpose once a claim has been lodged;
the harm done to landowners by the impediments placed upon
them by sections 11(7) and (8); the vulnerability of the claimants
and the harm that might be suffered by them if the status quo is not
preserved; and the fact that there is an unrestricted right to
approach a different official, the Chief Land Claims
Commissioner, for authority to evict a claimant or interfere with
improvements on the land. It might also be necessary to consider
whether the Act reasonably requires claims to be processed
expeditiously.
These are all matters on which the Supreme Court can and
should give a decision, and which ought to be canvassed in the
Supreme Court in the light of any evidence placed before it, before
any approach is made to this court for relief. A constitutional issue
will arise only if the Supreme Court were to hold that the Act
requires claims to be dealt with in a manner inconsistent with
procedurally fair administrative action. It is premature to approach
this court for a decision, before that issue has been determined.
35
The DLA immediately made changes to the Act by inserting
section I1 A.'36 This new section entitles any person affected by a
section 11(1) notice to make representations to the regional
Commissioner for the withdrawal or amendment of the notice.'37
131 Id. at 632.
136 § 5 of Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act 78 of 1996, 4
BSRSA pt. 21 (2000).
137 Id.
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The piecemeal amendment to these acts confuses those
members of the public who use them. Unfortunately, the
responsible department, in order to beat deadlines, rushes
amendments through Parliament, while neglecting the long-term
view of the Act as a whole and failing to ensure streamlining to
obviate jurisdictional and other problems. The jurisdictional
problem is easily solved by making the laws justiciable in one
court. In addition, consultation between the drafters and the
implementers of the legislation would facilitate the drafting
process.
The confusion exists among people who believe they have a
claim for restitution of land rights and then are told that they do
not and should wait their turn in the redistribution queue. These
people sometimes labour under the misconception that the same
piece of land they laid claim to under the restitution process will
be redistributed to them. When this does not happen, there is great
disappointment, resulting at times in unnecessary, expensive
litigation.'38 An in-depth consultation with claimants explaining the
various processes and options open to them would be helpful.
The cutoff dates in the Restitution Act, namely June 19, 1913
and December 31, 1998 have left too many people unhappy with
the process. It is often traumatic for claimants to hear that their
claims must fail because they were dispossessed on June 12, 1913
when their neighbours, who were dispossessed on June 19, 1913,
succeed. Such claimants resort to demanding aboriginal title,
which is beyond the jurisdiction of the LCC. People dispossessed
prior to June 19, 1913 are referred to the redistribution process,
meaning that any hope of restoration is lost. Similarly, there are
many people who feel aggrieved by the cutoff date of December
31, 1998. Some argue that the land issue is a very sensitive,
emotive, and emotional issue. It is an issue about which nations go
to war. Therefore, in a situation where a political dispensation was
negotiated, it is imperative for people to be given sufficient
opportunity to claim reparations. Put differently, if they cannot get
what they went to war to attain and what they negotiated at the
settlement talks, why should they not go back to war? The
proponents of the argument appreciate the need for finality on the
process, but argue that in this process one is dealing with a
138 See, e.g., Mahlangu NO v. Minister of Land Affairs & Others.
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population, some 45 percent of which is illiterate, scattered in the
rural areas without any sophisticated communication means.
Therefore, to give such a short time to people to come forward
with their claims is equivalent to not giving them any opportunity
at all.
As discussed above, the process is laden with frustration and
impatience as a result of its slowness. On the other hand, it lends
legitimacy and credibility, which is very important given the fact
that the political dispensation is a product of settlement
negotiations.
Finally, the lack of a developmental strategy in the restitution
process has long been a cause for concern for the judges of the
court and they have expressed this concern in their judgments.' 9 It
would not be surprising to find that this is the one main reason
people suddenly develop cold feet once restitution has been
ordered and the moment of returning to the land has arrived.
Thankfully, the DLA has now incorporated this strategy into its
policy. It only remains to see how it will be implemented.
When all is said and done, all the above-mentioned problems
are but minor irritations in an otherwise very successful process. If
it was so perfect that nobody complained, then it would not be a
human endeavor, but God-given.
139 See, e.g., Kranspoort Cmty. Concerning the Farm Kranspoort, 48 LS 2000 (2)
SALR 124 (LCC).
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